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Abstract Businesses are naturally interested in detecting anomalies in their inter-
nal processes, because these can be indicators for fraud and inefficiencies. Within
the domain of business intelligence, classic anomaly detection is not very frequently
researched. In this paper, we propose a method, using autoencoders, for detect-
ing and analyzing anomalies occurring in the execution of a business process. Our
method does not rely on any prior knowledge about the process and can be trained
on a noisy dataset already containing the anomalies. We demonstrate its effective-
ness by evaluating it on 700 different datasets and testing its performance against
three state-of-the-art anomaly detection methods. This paper is an extension of
our previous work from 2016 [30]. Compared to the original publication we have
further refined the approach in terms of performance and conducted an elaborate
evaluation on more sophisticated datasets including real-life event logs from the
Business Process Intelligence Challenges of 2012 and 2017. In our experiments our
approach reached an F1 score of 0.87, whereas the best unaltered state-of-the-art
approach reached an F1 score of 0.72. Furthermore, our approach can be used to
analyze the detected anomalies in terms of which event within one execution of
the process causes the anomaly.
Keywords Deep Learning · Autoencoder · Anomaly Detection · Process Mining ·
Business Intelligence
1 Introduction
Anomaly detection is becoming an integral part of business intelligence. Businesses
are naturally interested in detecting anomalies in their processes, because these
can be indicators for inefficiencies in their process, badly trained employees, or
even fraudulent behavior. Consequently, being able to detect such anomalies is of
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great value, for they can have enormous impact on the economic well-being of the
businesses.
More and more companies rely on process-aware information systems (PAISs)
[13] to improve their processes. This increasing number of PAISs has generated
a lot of interest in the data these systems are gathering. The log files these sys-
tems are storing can be used to extract the events executed in the process, and
thereby create so called event log files. Event logs are comprised of activities (and
other miscellaneous information) that occurred during the execution of the pro-
cess. These event logs enable process analysts to explore the underlying process.
In other words, the event log consists of footprints of the process. Consequently, it
is possible to recreate the process model by evaluating its event log. This is known
as process model discovery and is one of the main ideas in the domain of process
mining [42].
Process mining provides methodologies to detect anomalies in the execution
of a process; e.g., by discovering the as-is process model from the event log [1]
using discovery algorithms and then comparing the discovered model to a refer-
ence model. This is known as conformance checking [35]. Another way of detecting
anomalies is to compare the event log to the reference model. However, this ap-
proach requires the existence of such a reference model.
If no reference model is available, process mining relies on discovering a refer-
ence model from the event log itself [4,3]. These methods make use of a threshold
to deal with infrequent behavior in the log, so that the discovered model is a good
representation of the normal behavior of the process. Hence, this model can be
used as a reference model for the conformance check.
A key assumption in anomaly detection is that the anomalous executions oc-
cur less frequent than normal executions. This skewed distribution can be taken
advantage of when applying anomaly detection techniques.
In this paper, we propose a method for detecting anomalies in business process
data. Our method works under the following assumptions.
– No prior knowledge about the process
– Training data already contains anomalies
– No reference model needed
– No labels needed (i.e., no knowledge about anomalies)
– The algorithm must detect the exact activity at which the anomaly occurred
The system must deduce the difference between normal and anomalous ex-
ecutions purely based on the patterns in the raw data. Our approach is based
on a special type of neural network, called an autoencoder, that is trained in an
unsupervised fashion.
The main contribution of this work is the application of an autoencoder to ana-
lyze the detected anomalies in terms of which event within a sequence is anomalous
as opposed to the whole sequence at once. This can be refined further by analyz-
ing which characteristic of the event (e.g., the executing user) is anomalous, not
just the event itself. We demonstrate that, using this approach, we can accurately
identify activities that have been executed in the wrong order, skipped, or un-
necessarily reworked. Furthermore, we can detect when unauthorized users have
illegally executed an activity.
To demonstrate the feasibility of our approach we compare its performance
to seven state-of-the-art methods for anomaly detection. In addition to these six
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methods, we also present an adaptation of one of the methods. All methods were
applied to a comprehensive set of 600 different artificial event logs featuring au-
thentic business process anomalies as well as 100 real-life event logs coming from
the Business Process Intelligence Challenge (BPIC).
In summary, the contributions of this paper are as follows.
1. Novel application of autoencoders to automatically analyze anomalies in the
domain of business process intelligence.
2. Adaptation of the t-STIDE anomaly detection method from [43] to work with
event attributes.
3. Comprehensive evaluation of state-of-the-art anomaly detection methods in
the domain of business process intelligence.
4. Provision of a representative, labelled, set of artificial process event logs con-
taining authentic anomalies.
2 Related Work
In the field of process mining [42] anomaly detection is not very frequently re-
searched. Most proposed methods work by using discovery algorithms to mine a
reference model from the event log [4] and then using it for conformance checking
to detect anomalous behavior. The bigger part of these methods relies on a clean
dataset to work correctly. Unfortunately, this violates our assumptions, as the data
coming from the PAISs will naturally contain anomalies.
Recently there has been some research on approaches that can deal with noisy
event logs. Through the use of special discovery algorithms, that can deal with
noise and infrequent behavior in the process, the approach from [4] can be refined
to work with noisy logs [3]. The authors in [3] give three different algorithms in
their paper. Within this work we will compare our approach to two of the proposed
approaches.
A more recent publication proposes the use of likelihood graphs to analyze
business process behavior [5]. Specifically, the authors describe a method to extend
the likelihood graph to include event attributes. This method works both on noisy
event logs and includes important characteristics of the process itself by including
the event attributes. We will also compare our method to the method from [5] in
the evaluation section.
A review of classic anomaly detection methodology can be found in [32]. Here,
the authors describe and compare many methods that have been proposed over
the last decades. Another elaborate summary on anomaly detection in discrete se-
quences is given by Chandola in [7]. The authors differentiate between five different
basic methods for novelty detection: probabilistic, distance-based, reconstruction-
based, domain-based, and information-theoretic novelty detection.
Probabilistic approaches try to estimate the probability distribution of the
normal class, and thus can detect anomalies as they were sampled from a different
distribution. In speech recognition [23], hidden Markov models (HMMs) [33,34] are
a popular choice for modeling sequential data. HMMs can also be used for anomaly
detection as shown in [43] and [21], where they are used successfully for system
intrusion detection. However, as Chandola pointed out in [8], the performance of
such HMMs strongly depends on the fact that the raw data can be sufficiently
modeled by a Markov process.
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Another important probabilistic technique is the sliding window approach as
proposed in [15], where it is used for intrusion detection. In window based anomaly
detection, every window of a sequence is assigned an anomaly score. Then the
anomaly score of the sequence can be inferred by aggregating the window anomaly
scores. Recently, Wressnegger et al. used this approach for intrusion detection and
give an elaborate evaluation in [45]. While being inexpensive and easy to imple-
ment, sliding window approaches show a robust performance in finding anomalies
in sequential data, especially within short regions of the data [7].
Distance-based novelty detection does not require a cleaned dataset, yet it
is only partly applicable for process traces, as anomalous traces are usually very
similar to normal ones. A popular distance-based approach is the one-class support
vector machine (OC-SVM). Scho¨lkopf et al. [37] first used support vector machines
[9] for anomaly detection. Tax, in his PhD thesis [40], gives a sophisticated overview
over one-class classification methods, also mentioning the OC-SVM. OC-SVMs
have shown to be successful in the field of intrusion detection as demonstrated by
[19].
Reconstruction-based novelty detection (e.g., neural networks) is similar to the
aforementioned approaches in [17,22]. However, training a neural network usually
also requires a cleaned dataset. Nevertheless, we will show that our approach works
on the noisy dataset by taking advantage of the skewed distribution of normal data
and anomalies, as demonstrated in [14].
Domain-based novelty detection requires domain knowledge, which violates our
assumption of no prior knowledge about the process. Information-theoretic novelty
detection defines anomalies as the examples that most influence an information
measure (e.g., entropy) on the whole dataset. Iteratively removing the data with
the highest impact will yield a cleaned dataset, and thus a set of anomalies.
The approach within this paper is highly influenced by the works in [12,17,
22], in which they propose the use of replicator neural networks [18] for anomaly
detection, i.e., networks that reproduce their input, which are based on the idea
of autoencoders from [20]. Autoassociative neural network encoders use a similar
concept and have been used to model the nominal behavior of complex systems
[41]. They have also been used for residual generation in [11], demonstrating that
these models can also model behavior not directly observed in the training data,
which increases generalization. A comprehensive study of replicator neural net-
works for outlier detection can be found in [44]. The approaches from [11,12,17,
22,41], however, do not work well with variable length input. In our approach, we
address this problem by using a padding technique. We opted to use a neural net-
work based approach, for recent achievements in machine translation and natural
language processing indicate that neural networks are an excellent choice when
modeling sequential data [10,26].
The main distinction between all other methods and the proposed approach
is that it can be used to identify which exact event and furthermore which at-
tribute characteristic is the cause of the anomaly. The only other approach that
can deal with event attributes is the method from [5]. However, it can not deal
with long-term dependencies, because it works on a general likelihood graph, which
disregards the past events when calculating the probability of an event occurring
at a specific point in the process. Our approach can deal both with the attributes
and with non-local dependencies in the logs.
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Table 1 Example event log of a procurement process
Trace ID Timestamp Activity User
1 2015-03-21 12:38:39 PR Created Roy
1 2015-03-28 07:09:26 PR Released Earl
1 2015-04-07 22:36:15 PO Created James
1 2015-04-08 22:12:08 PO Released Roy
1 2015-04-21 16:59:49 Goods Receipt Ryan
2 2015-05-14 11:31:53 SC Created Marilyn
2 2015-05-21 09:21:26 SC Purchased Emily
2 2015-05-28 18:48:27 SC Approved Roy
2 2015-06-01 04:43:08 PO Created Johnny
3 Dataset
PAISs keep a record of almost everything that happened during the execution of
a business process. This information can be extracted from the systems in form of
an event log. Event logs are the most common data structure when working with
process data from PAISs, especially in the field of process mining.
3.1 Event logs
An event log consists of traces, each consisting of the activities that have been
executed. Table 1 shows an excerpt of such an event log. In this case, it is repre-
sentative for the execution of a procurement process. Notice that an event log must
consist of at least three columns: a trace ID, to uniquely assign an executed activ-
ity to a trace; a timestamp, to order the activities within a trace; and an activity
label, to distinguish the different activities. Optionally, the event log can contain
so called event attributes. In the example event log from Tab. 1, the user column is
such an event attribute, indicating which user has executed the respective activity.
3.2 Process model generation
To create a test setting for our approach we randomly generated process models
and then sampled event logs from them. The process models were generated using
PLG2 [6], a process simulation and randomization tool. Each process model has
a different complexity, with regard to the number of possible activities and the
branching factors (i.e., out-degrees). The complexity of a process model can also
be measured by the number of possible variants. A variant is a valid path through
the complete process model from a valid start activity to a valid end activity.
Table 2 shows the process models with their corresponding complexities. Note
that the Wide process model was specifically generated to evaluate the approach
on a dataset that has low complexity in terms of the number of variants, but a
high branching factor.
Now, we generated authentic event logs from these process models by randomly
sampling variants of the process with replacement. In real process models these
variants are not equally distributed. Therefore, we randomly generated a distribu-
tion for the variants each time we were sampling an event log. These probabilities
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Table 2 Overview over the 5 different randomly generated process models and the P2P process
Model #Nodes #Edges #Variants Max length ∅ Out-degree
P2P 14 16 6 9 1.14
Small 22 26 6 10 1.18
Medium 34 48 25 8 1.41
Large 44 56 28 12 1.27
Huge 56 75 39 11 1.34
Wide 36 53 19 7 1.47
were sampled from a normal distribution with µ = 1 and σ = 0.2, and then nor-
malized so they sum up to 1. Furthermore, we randomly generated a set of users
in the process (between 10 and 30 different users per process). Then we sampled
subsets of the user set for each activity, denoting which users are permitted to
execute the activity. The number of possible users per activity lies between 1 and
5. After computing all variants, we also introduced a long-term dependency for
the user variable in each variant at random. Therefore, we randomly chose two
activities in each variant that must be executed by the same user.
3.3 Example process
In addition to the five randomly generated models, we also used a simplified version
of a purchase to pay (P2P) process model as is depicted by the BPMN model in
Fig. 1. This model was mainly created for purposes of evaluation, as it features
interpretable activity names unlike the randomly generated models. The resulting
event log for the P2P model was generated in the same fashion as those of the
randomly generated models using the same parameters as mentioned above. Notice
the possible users for each activity as indicated by the italic names in Fig. 1.
3.4 Anomalies
To introduce noise into the event logs we randomly applied mutations to a fixed
percentage of the traces in the event log. These mutations represent the anomalies
in the data. Each trace can be affected by one of the following five anomalies (we
will use their respective names from now on):
1. Skipping: A necessary activity has not been executed,
2. Switching: Two consecutive events have been executed in the wrong order,
3. Reworking: An activity has been executed twice in a row,
4. Incorrect user : A user has executed an activity to which he was not permitted,
5. Incorrect LTD : The wrong user has executed the long-term dependent activity.
Compared to our work in [30], we have added two more anomalies that we
found occur very frequently in real-life scenarios. A classic problem in real-life
business processes is the segregation of duty. For example, a user that approves
a purchase order must not be the same user that has initially created it. Many
anomalies in real-life processes are related to the users executing the events, which
is why we included this event attribute here.
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PR Created
James, Johnny
SC Created
Emily
SC Purchased
Roy, James
SC Approved
Earl, Emily
PR Released
Ryan, Johnny
PO Created
Earl
PO Released
Johnny
PO Dec.
James, Amanda
PO Inc.
Ryan, Craig
Goods Receipt
Craig
Invoice
Howard, Brian
Payment
Craig
Fig. 1 BPMN model of a simplified purchase to pay process; the italic names represent the
users allowed to execute that activity
Our way of generating the artificial event logs is very similar to the methods
of Bezerra [3] and Bo¨hmer [5]. One difference is, that we also introduce anomalies
affecting event attributes. We will make these datasets, the generation algorithm,
and our implementation of the algorithm publicly available. For more information
on this, please consider contacting the corresponding author.
For each process model, we randomly generated a set of permitted users for each
activity. We did this ten times, resulting in 60 different process models. For each of
these 60 process models, we then generated 10 event logs, each featuring a different
percentage of anomalies and a random variant distribution. The percentage of
anomalous traces in the training log ranged from 10%, 20%, up to 100%. That is,
we generated training logs containing 10% anomalies and 90% normal traces, as
well as logs with 80% anomalies and 20% normal traces, and so on up to a log
which entirely consists of anomalies, i.e., 100%. In total, we generated 600 different
artificial event logs. Each event log consisted of 12 500 traces. For each event log
we created a separate test event log containing 2 500 traces featuring the same
variant distribution and users.
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3.5 Real-life event logs
In addition to the artificial event logs we also generated training and test event
logs from the public datasets of the Business Process Intelligence Challenge 20121
and 20172, which we will refer to as BPIC12 and BPIC17 respectively. BPIC17
is an updated version of BPIC12, representing the same loan application process.
However, BPIC17 contains data from the last 5 years, after the company has
introduced a new workflow system.
Similarly to the artificial logs, we used the event logs as a basis and randomly
applied anomalies to a fixed percentage of traces in the logs. As these logs did not
feature a user attribute we did not include the Incorrect user and Incorrect LTD
anomalies. For BPIC12 and BPIC17 we generated training sets featuring between
10% and 100% anomalies, as was done for the artificial logs. We also generated
separate test sets for both logs, resulting in 100 real-life training event logs with
artificial anomalies.
4 Method
Recently, artificial neural networks have gotten a lot of attention by outclassing
the state-of-the-art methods in many domains such as object recognition in images
[25] or machine translation [2]. Before we introduce our method, we first want to
give a brief overview over the neural network architecture we employed.
A feed-forward neural network consists of multiple layers, each containing many
neurons. Every neuron in one layer is connected to all neurons in the preceding and
succeeding layers. These connections have weights attached to them, which can be
used to control the impact a neuron in one layer has on the activation of a neuron in
the next layer. To calculate the output of a neuron we apply a non-linear activation
function (a popular choice is the rectifier function f(x) = max(0, x) [29]) to the
sum over all outputs of the neurons in the previous layer times their respective
connection weights. The initialization of these weights is important, as pointed
out in [16], for no two weights within one layer must be initialized to the same
value. Then, the back-propagation algorithm [36] is used to iteratively tune the
weights, so that the neural network produces the desired output, or a close enough
approximation of it.
In a classification setting, the desired output of the neural network is the class
label. However, a neural network can also be trained without the use of class
labels. One such type of neural network is called an autoencoder. Instead of using
class labels, we are using the original input as the target output when training the
autoencoder. Obviously, a neural network, if given enough capacity and time, can
simply learn the identity function of all examples in the training set. To overcome
this issue, some kind of capacity limitation is needed. This can be done by forcing
one of the autoencoder’s hidden layers to be narrow (i.e., narrower than the input
dimension), thereby not allowing the autoencoder to learn the identity function.
Another common way of limiting the capacity is to distribute additive Gaussian
noise over the input vector of the autoencoder. Thus, the autoencoder—even if
1 http://www.win.tue.nl/bpi/doku.php?id=2012:challenge
2 http://www.win.tue.nl/bpi/doku.php?id=2017:challenge
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Noise
Event log ReplicationAutoencoder
Fig. 2 Autoencoder is trained to replicate the traces in the event log after the addition of
Gaussian noise
repeatedly trained on the same trace—will always receive a different input. We
use a combination of both these strategies for our method.
4.1 Setup
To train an autoencoder on the generated event logs, we first must transform them.
The first step is to encode each activity and user using a one-hot encoding. Each
activity is encoded by an n-dimensional vector, where n is the number of different
activities encountered in the event log. To encode one activity, we simply set the
corresponding dimension of the one-hot vector to a fixed value of one, while setting
all the other dimensions to zero. We use the same method to encode the user event
attribute. This results in a one-hot vector for the activity and another for the user
for each event in a trace. Now we combine these vectors by concatenating them
into one vector. If the activity vectors are a1, a2, ..., an and the respective user
vectors are u1, u2, ..., un, the resulting vector will be a1‖u1‖a2‖u2‖...‖an‖un, where
‖ denotes concatenation.
Note that another option of dealing with variable size traces is dividing the
traces into subsequences of equal size (n-grams). However, using n-grams of events
loses the connection between distant events, if the n-gram size is too narrow. Con-
sequently, the system is unable accurately model long-term dependencies between
events. Therefore, we chose to use the one-hot encoding method.
Because feed-forward neural networks have a fixed size input, we must apply
one more step of pre-processing. To force all encoded trace vectors to have the
same size we pad all vectors with zeros, so each vector has the same size as the
longest vector (i.e., the longest trace) in the event log.
Suppose an event log consists of 10 different activities, 20 different users, and
the maximum length of all traces in the event log is 12. The longest trace within
the event log will have a size of (10 + 20) · 12 = 360. Therefore, we must pad all
shorter vectors with zeros so they reach size 360.
Using the one-hot encoded event log we can train the autoencoder with the
back-propagation algorithm [36], using the event log both as the input and the
label. Figure 2 shows a simplified version of the architecture. The special noise
layer adds Gaussian noise before feeding the input into the autoencoder. This
layer is only active during training. Now the autoencoder is trained to reproduce
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its input, that is, to minimize the mean squared error between the input and its
output.
We trained on mini batches of size 50 for 200 epochs, allowing early stopping
when the loss on the validation set did not decrease within the last 10 epochs. We
used the Adam optimizer [24], which utilizes the momentum technique [39]. We set
the optimizer parameters to β1 = 0.9, β2 = 0.99 and  = 10
−8. The learning rate
was set to 0.001 initially, and was scaled by a factor of 0.1 when the validation loss
did not improve within the last 5 epochs. Additionally, we used a dropout of 0.5
between all layers, as suggested in [38]; the additive noise applied to the input was
sampled from a Gaussian distribution with µ = 0 and σ = 0.1. Each autoencoder
consists of an input and an output layer with linear units, and 2 hidden layers with
rectified linear units. These training parameters were used for each of the different
event logs, but the size of the hidden layer was adapted depending on the event
log, i.e., the number of neurons in the hidden layer was set to be half the size of
the input layer. For the real-life BPIC event logs we only used 1 hidden layer.
4.2 Classifying traces
After training the autoencoder, it can be used to reproduce the traces in the
test event logs, but without applying the noise. Now, we can measure the mean
squared error between the input vector and the output vector to detect anomalies
in the event log. Because the distribution of normal traces and anomalous traces
in the event log is one sided, we can assume that the autoencoder will reproduce
the normal traces with less reproduction error than the anomalies. Therefore, we
can define a threshold τ , where if the reproduction error of a trace succeeds this
threshold τ , we consider it an anomaly. To set the threshold we use the mean
reproduction error over the training dataset and apply a scaling factor α. We
define the threshold as in Equation 1, where ei is the reproduction error for trace
i, and n the number of traces in the dataset.
τ =
α
n
n∑
i=1
ei (1)
4.3 Classifying events and attributes
We have described how to detect anomalous traces in the event log; now we want
to refine this method. Not only can we detect that a trace is anomalous, but
also which event in the trace influences the reproduction error the most. Hence,
we must change our calculation of the reproduction error from trace based to
event based. Up until now, we calculated the reproduction error as the mean
squared error between the entire one-hot encoded input and output sequence of
the autoencoder. However, we can also consider the mean squared error for every
event in the sequence separately. Furthermore, we can also compute the error for
each activity and user separately.
Let us consider the example input vector i from Equation 2. We can divide the
vector into the corresponding subvectors, as indicated by the curly braces. This
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gives us a1, u1, a2, u2, ..., an, un. Now we can split the reproduced version of i (i.e.,
the output vector) identically, obtaining aˆ1, uˆ1, aˆ2, uˆ2, ..., aˆ3, uˆ3.
i = [ 00001︸ ︷︷ ︸
a1
0100︸︷︷︸
u1
10000︸ ︷︷ ︸
a2
0010︸︷︷︸
u2
... 01000︸ ︷︷ ︸
an
0100︸︷︷︸
un
] (2)
The error E for an activity vector ai is then given by the mean squared error
between ai and aˆi. For a user vector ui the method works analogously. Thus, we
can compute the error for all activity vectors and all user vectors over the whole
dataset. Notice that this works for any number of event attributes.
The benefit is that we can distinguish between activity related anomalies and
user related anomalies. We will elaborate on this in the evaluation section below.
5 Evaluation
We evaluated the autoencoder approach (DAE) on all 700 event logs and compared
it to state-of-the-art anomaly detection methods mentioned [7]. Namely: a sliding
window approach named t-STIDE [43]; the one-class SVM approach (OC-SVM);
and the Markovian approach using a hidden Markov model (HMM) [43]. In addi-
tion to that, we also compared our approach to two approaches proposed in [3], the
Naive algorithm and the Sampling algorithm. Lastly, we compared our approach
to the most recent approach proposed in [5], using an extended likelihood graph
(Likelihood). As a baseline we provide the results of a random classifier.
For the OC-SVM we relied on the implementation of the scikit-learn package
for Python [31] using an RBF kernel of degree 3 and a ν = 0.6. The HMM approach
was implemented using the hmmlearn package for Python. We implemented the
t-STIDE algorithm ourselves using a window size k = 4. The hyperparameters
for both approaches were optimized using grid search. The Naive, Sampling, and
Likelihood methods were implemented as described in the original papers.
At last, we used our own implementation of the t-STIDE method which we
will refer to as t-STIDE+. The classic t-STIDE approach only takes into account
the activities of an event log, but not the attributes. To make use of the attributes
we must adapt the original method.
A window of size k is a tuple of k events, where each event consists of a tuple
of the activity name a and the corresponding user u. Let us consider an example
window size of three. A window w is defined as w = {(a1, u1), (a2, u2), (a3, u3)}.
The approach works by employing a frequency analysis over all windows of size k
in the training set, and then comparing the relative frequencies of all windows in
the test set to the corresponding ones from the training set. Whenever a window’s
relative frequency is significantly lower than its frequency in the training set, the
trace containing this window is considered an anomaly. We evaluated the t-STIDE
and the t-STIDE+ approach on all datasets and for all feasible choices of k, i.e.,
k was chosen to lie between 2 and the maximum trace length in the dataset. The
evaluation showed that k = 4 performed the best for both approaches.
We used the threshold technique from Equation 1 for all approaches except the
OC-SVM, for the scikit-learn implementation automatically optimizes the thresh-
old. For the other approaches, we optimized the scaling factor α by an exhaustive
grid search. One requirement when setting α was that α must be the same for all
event logs, i.e., we strive for a general setting of α.
12 Timo Nolle et al.
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Fig. 3 F1 score by process model and method
Table 3 Results of the experiments for all evaluated methods for each process model; best
results are shown in bold typeface
P2P Small Medium Large Huge Wide
Baseline 0.44 ± 0.01 0.44 ± 0.01 0.44 ± 0.01 0.44 ± 0.01 0.44 ± 0.01 0.44 ± 0.01
HMM [43] 0.47 ± 0.02 0.46 ± 0.01 0.46 ± 0.01 0.45 ± 0.02 0.47 ± 0.01 0.45 ± 0.02
OC-SVM [37] 0.72 ± 0.06 0.72 ± 0.05 0.70 ± 0.05 0.65 ± 0.04 0.68 ± 0.05 0.72 ± 0.05
Naive [3] 0.61 ± 0.01 0.62 ± 0.01 0.61 ± 0.03 0.62 ± 0.01 0.62 ± 0.02 0.62 ± 0.02
Sampling [3] 0.47 ± 0.03 0.48 ± 0.05 0.48 ± 0.06 0.50 ± 0.06 0.50 ± 0.06 0.48 ± 0.05
t-STIDE [43] 0.61 ± 0.01 0.61 ± 0.03 0.62 ± 0.02 0.62 ± 0.01 0.63 ± 0.01 0.62 ± 0.02
Likelihood [5] 0.77 ± 0.17 0.75 ± 0.14 0.73 ± 0.15 0.62 ± 0.10 0.68 ± 0.11 0.75 ± 0.17
t-STIDE+ 0.85 ± 0.09 0.85 ± 0.08 0.82 ± 0.09 0.82 ± 0.07 0.81 ± 0.05 0.83 ± 0.11
DAE 0.87 ± 0.09 0.90 ± 0.07 0.85 ± 0.08 0.88 ± 0.07 0.84 ± 0.08 0.86 ± 0.08
We also considered isolation forests [27,28] for our experiments; however, this
approach relies on setting a contamination parameter indicating the noise level of
the data, rendering the approach unusable as we assume no prior knowledge about
the noise level.
We evaluated the 9 methods on all 600 artificial, as well as the 100 real-life
event logs. In total, we evaluated 6 300 models.
5.1 Experiment results
Figure 3 shows the F1 score of all methods for each process model. The F1 score
per model was calculated using the macro average for each model. Then all F1
scores were averaged over all models for the corresponding process model. A more
detailed evaluation is given in Tab. 3 and Table 4, which show the F1 scores
and their standard deviation for each process model, best results being shown in
bold typeset. Notice that the DAE approach performs best in all settings, closely
followed by t-STIDE+, whereas the other approaches perform significantly worse.
Another interesting point is that the HMM approach performs no better than the
random baseline, which supports Chandola’s claim that HMMs are not a good
method for anomaly detection in sequential data [8]. Also the Sampling approach
performs only slightly better than chance. However, this is due to the fact that we
average all results over all training sets including training event logs with higher
Analyzing Business Process Anomalies Using Autoencoders 13
Table 4 Results on the BPIC event logs; best results are shown in bold typeface
BPIC12 BPIC17
Baseline 0.46 ± 0.01 0.47 ± 0.01
HMM [43] 0.46 ± 0.00 0.51 ± 0.00
OC-SVM [37] 0.58 ± 0.07 0.71 ± 0.04
Naive [3] 0.61 ± 0.12 0.75 ± 0.12
Sampling [3] 0.41 ± 0.00 0.42 ± 0.00
t-STIDE [43] 0.68 ± 0.14 0.81 ± 0.02
Likelihood [5] 0.61 ± 0.12 0.75 ± 0.12
t-STIDE+ 0.68 ± 0.14 0.81 ± 0.02
DAE 0.72 ± 0.08 0.82 ± 0.05
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Fig. 4 F1 score by percentage of anomalous traces in the training set
share of anomalies. In Fig. 4 we can see that the Sampling method works only for
low noise levels.
Overall, we can conclude that the DAE performs better than the state-of-the-
art methods in all of our test settings.
5.2 The impact of the noise level
As described before, we used different noise levels when generating the datasets, by
generating training sets which included between 10% and 100% anomalous traces.
We use the word noise to refer to the share of traces in the training set which are
anomalous. Notice that an anomalous trace still contains normal subsequences of
events. Only a small part of the trace is affected by the anomaly in our test settings.
Hence, there is still normal behavior present in parts of each trace, even when
each trace has been affected by an anomaly, as in the 100% case. We specifically
included these harsh noise levels to test the different approaches on their ability
to generalize. We want to point out, however, that noise levels greater than 50%
are extremely unlikely in real-world settings.
One can also argue that a noise level greater than 50% is illogical, because the
classification task just gets inverted; hence, the anomaly class becomes the normal
class. This is not true for the same reason as before. As we are dealing with
sequential data and many different events in sequence (i.e., a trace) are assigned
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one label, there are still events that carry information about the normal behavior
of the process. And in most cases the normal events in an anomalous trace, still
overpower the anomalous ones. Hence, a noise level of 60% is not the same as a
noise level of 40% with classes inverted.
Figure 4 shows the F1 score for all methods for the different noise levels. Again,
we find that the DAE outperforms the other approach at all noise levels, again
closely followed by t-STIDE+.
Notice that the DAE still performs remarkably well, even when trained on the
100% training set. This is due to its ability to generalize over multiple traces. The
t-STIDE approaches can also generalize over multiple traces, because they classify
based on windows; and the windows itself can contain a completely valid sequence
of events. These approaches can learn what a normal trace ought to look like,
by combining the knowledge they gathered of normal subsequences over multiple
traces. For the t-STIDE approaches this is obvious, as the window size is usually
smaller than the trace is long; hence, it is only trained on subsequences in the first
place. The DAE, on the other hand, is trained on the whole trace at once, which
makes this level of generalization much more remarkable and unique among all
the approaches.
5.3 Interpreting the anomalies
An interesting feature of the DAE approach is that it can be used to detect not
only anomalous traces, but also which event or which event attribute has influenced
the reproduction error the most. This can be done by computing the reproduction
error for each event attribute separately, as described earlier. Figure 5 shows 12
example traces of the P2P test dataset for a DAE trained on a training set with
10% anomalous traces. For clarity, we only show the first 6 events omitting the
remaining events. The cells are colored according to the reproduction error; the
higher the error the darker the color.
As we can clearly see, it is never the whole trace that leads to a high reproduc-
tion error. The DAE succeeds to reproduce the normal parts of the traces quite
well, whereas it fails to reproduce the anomalous parts. For example, the first two
Normal traces are reproduced with almost no error at all, which is exactly what we
expected. Let us now look at the four examples at the bottom (Incorrect user and
Incorrect LTD). The DAE is remarkably good at detecting incorrect users. Nei-
ther Craig, nor Earl, are permitted to execute the activity PR Created (cf. Fig. 1).
Detecting Incorrect LTD works just as fine.
Moving to the three anomalies from the original paper, we want to recall one
problem that we have observed during the evaluation in [30]. Whenever an activity
is skipped or reworked, the remaining subsequence is shifted by one to the left, or
the right respectively. In [30] this led to the effect that all activities after the initial
skipped (or reworked) activity had high reproduction error. This phenomenon does
not occur as severely in the extended approach, but it is still noticeable. We assume
that the additional hidden layers provide enough abstraction so the DAE can adapt
to this problem.
Overall, we can see that the approach is very precise in narrowing down the
exact cause of the anomaly. In fact, this approach can be used to perform an
automatic root cause analysis on the detected anomalies, without the need of
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Fig. 5 DAE error heatmap, trained on a P2P event log with 10% anomalous traces
an extra processing step. Most other anomaly detection algorithms can only be
used to divide the normal examples from the anomalies, but then an additional
algorithm has to be used to, for instance, cluster the anomalies. Another important
point about this is that it allows to follow what the DAE has learned as well as
to interpret it. Usually, not being interpretable is a notorious problem for neural
network based approaches. Not in this case.
5.4 Discussion
At last we want to point out some interesting observations. You might notice that
in the two Skipping examples the user at index 5, Amanda, produces a high repro-
duction error. This is due to the fact that this event has a long-term dependency
to an earlier event. In the first case the event is connected to the PO Decreased
event, in the second one the connected event is the event that has been skipped.
Now that the trace has, in part, been shifted due to the skipping, the original event
from index 6 is now at index 5. Essentially, we have detected a fluke anomaly, that
was not supposed to be there, yet the DAE approach has found it, demonstrating
the feasibility of the approach.
This indicates, as already mentioned in [30], that the DAE is sensitive towards
the actual position of an event within a trace, which also becomes apparent in the
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Table 5 Results of the experiments for the anomalous event classifier per label and process
model; best results are shown in bold typeface
Resolution Method Average Normal Anomaly
Traces Baseline 0.44 ± 0.01 0.25 ± 0.01 0.62 ± 0.01
HMM [43] 0.46 ± 0.02 0.17 ± 0.06 0.75 ± 0.05
OC-SVM [37] 0.70 ± 0.06 0.51 ± 0.09 0.89 ± 0.05
Naive [3] 0.62 ± 0.02 0.49 ± 0.02 0.74 ± 0.02
Sampling [3] 0.48 ± 0.05 0.11 ± 0.18 0.86 ± 0.09
t-STIDE [43] 0.62 ± 0.02 0.49 ± 0.02 0.74 ± 0.02
Likelihood [5] 0.72 ± 0.15 0.52 ± 0.26 0.91 ± 0.07
t-STIDE+ 0.83 ± 0.08 0.73 ± 0.12 0.93 ± 0.05
DAE 0.87 ± 0.08 0.78 ± 0.13 0.95 ± 0.03
Events Sampling [3] 0.44 ± 0.17 0.64 ± 0.20 0.25 ± 0.14
t-STIDE [43] 0.66 ± 0.03 0.90 ± 0.02 0.42 ± 0.04
t-STIDE+ 0.61 ± 0.03 0.86 ± 0.03 0.36 ± 0.05
DAE 0.72 ± 0.02 0.92 ± 0.02 0.53 ± 0.04
Attributes t-STIDE+ 0.59 ± 0.03 0.87 ± 0.03 0.31 ± 0.06
DAE 0.70 ± 0.03 0.94 ± 0.01 0.47 ± 0.05
second Skipping example. The event PO Created is wrong, yet the DAE reproduces
it correctly. This is due to the fact the PO Created can be correct here when the
trace starts with the SC Created event.
Furthermore, we still observe some cross-talk between adjacent events. If we
inspect the first Switching example, we notice that SC Approved and SC Purchased
have been switched, as correctly identified by the DAE. However, the first event
also produces a high reproduction error, albeit being correct at that location. This
error, compared to the error at indices 2 and 3, is significantly lower.
Table 5 provides the average F1 score of the approaches when classifying traces,
events, and attributes respectively. When classifying attributes we classify the ac-
tivity and the user separately, whereas when classifying events we do not separate
the attributes. Therefore, we also produced labels indicating anomalous and nor-
mal event attributes, when generating the datasets. Any event attribute that had
not been affected by any of the anomalies, has been labeled normal, whereas all
other attributes have been labeled as anomalous. An event is an anomalous when
any of its attributes is anomalous and similarly a trace is anomalous when any of
its events is anomalous. Consequently, we can now calculate the performance of
the DAE based on single events.
Sampling, t-STIDE, and t-STIDE+ can all also naturally be used to classify
events. Apart from DAE, only t-STIDE+, due to our adaption of the algorithm,
can also be used to classify single attributes. This can be done, for instance, by as-
signing the specific window anomaly scores to the respective last event or attribute
in the window. Sampling relies on a conformance check, which per definition gives
a per event resolution. Table 5 shows that the DAE outperforms the other ap-
proaches in all three categories.
We can conclude that this approach can discover the special characteristics
of anomalies in an otherwise unknown process, while still being able to correctly
identify normal behavior. All together, we can say that the DAE approach is the
most versatile out of all the approaches, as it works well in all of our test settings.
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6 Conclusion
We have presented a novel application of denoising autoencoders to detect anoma-
lies in business process data. Our approach does not rely on any prior knowledge
about the process itself. Also, we do not rely on a clean dataset for the training;
our approach is trained on a noisy dataset already containing the anomalies. Fur-
thermore, we have demonstrated that the autoencoder can also be used to easily
identify the anomalous event(s) or event attribute(s), making results interpretable
with regards to why an anomaly has been classified as such. Even though we
showed that this approach works for business process data, it can be applied just
as easily to other domains with discrete sequential data.
We conducted a comprehensive evaluation using representative artificial and
real-life event logs. These event logs featured a range of different anomalies, dif-
ferent complexities in terms of the process model, variable variant probabilities,
random user sets for each activity, and different shares of anomalous traces, ranging
from 10% to 100%. We compared the autoencoder approach to 7 other state-of-
the-art anomaly detection methods, as described in [7,3,5,43], showing that our
approach outperforms all other methods in all of the test settings, reaching an F1
score of 0.87 on average, whereas the second-best approach, our own adaption of
the t-STIDE algorithm reached 0.83. The next best unaltered anomaly detection
algorithm, using an extended likelihood graph, reached an F1 score of 0.72. To our
knowledge, this is the most sophisticated evaluation and comparison of anomaly
detection methodology within the domain of process intelligence to date.
The biggest advantage of the autoencoder approach over the other methods
is that it allows to analyze the detected anomalies even further. Computing the
anomaly score for each event attribute individually, the approach indicates the
anomalous attribute very convincingly. To our knowledge, this method of analyz-
ing the anomalies is novel to the field of discovery science, as well as business
intelligence and process mining.
The presented approach is an extended version of the approach from [30]. In
the original paper, we postulated that the approach is susceptible to anomalous
behavior in the event log that is very frequent. However, by showing that the
approach works well for all noise levels, especially the higher noise levels where the
exact same anomaly can occur many times, we have shown this not to be the case.
We also showed, by using skewed variant distributions, that the autoencoder is
robust towards process models with unequally distributed variants, that is, some
variants (i.e., one valid path through the process model) are more likely than
others. By including the user as an event attribute, we demonstrated that more
dimensions can be added easily to the approach, without a significant loss of
accuracy.
As an inspiration for future work on the matter we want to give a few remarks.
Note that for the DAE approach to work in a real-time setting the trace length
of all future traces must be conform with the input size of the neural network.
If traces surpass the input size, they cannot be fed into the autoencoder. There
are some strategies to compensate for this problem. For example, the autoencoder
can be set up with spare padding input units. Instead of padding all traces to
match the maximum length encountered in the training set, we pad all traces to
an arbitrary length greater than the maximum length. If we do want to reuse the
already trained autoencoder, we can use another strategy. Every trace that is too
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long to feed into the autoencoder is divided into subsequences of exactly the size
of the input. For example, if an autoencoder has input size 10 and a trace has size
12, we would first feed the sequence starting from the first event until the tenth
event, then the sequence from the second until the eleventh, and so on. Then we
can average the anomaly scores over all subsequences. Another solution to the
problem is the use of recurrent neural networks, which can be used to consume
sequences of arbitrary length.
Another problem arises if one of the attributes is set to a value not encountered
during training. Consequently, there will be no dimension allocated in the one-hot
encoding for it. A simple solution to this problem is to add one extra dimension to
the encoding vector which is used to encode all unknown attribute characteristics.
Nevertheless, the autoencoder should be retrained regularly to counteract concept
drift.
With t-STIDE+ and DAE we have presented two approaches to detect anoma-
lies in business process data. It is quite costly to train a neural network on big
datasets, because the dataset needs to be iterated many times. The t-STIDE+
approach has the advantage that it can be trained with just one iteration.
However, due to the nature of the algorithm, it has some drawbacks; it cannot
capture long-term dependencies if the window size is too small and if the windows
size is too big the accuracy decreases. Furthermore, it is not trivial to assign an
anomaly score to a single attribute of an event, because anomaly scores are based
on windows. Lastly, it cannot deal with numerical event attributes (e.g., prices),
without resorting to binning or grouping, which is not obvious.
The DAE approach does not have these drawbacks. Numerical data can eas-
ily be modelled by using a single linear input and output neuron for real-valued
numbers. Certainly, it does require more training time, but with the introduction
of evermore powerful GPUs and lately TPUs the trade-off between accuracy and
efficiency is not as severe.
Overall, the results presented in this paper suggest that a denoising autoen-
coder is a reliable and versatile method for detecting—and interpreting—anomalies
in unknown business processes.
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